II. Assignment: Bogotá
My arrival at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá had, for the most part, a positive reception by the other ‘action’ agencies involved in supporting the Colombian war against the drug traffickers. I did get some push-back here and there that eventually went away once I demonstrated that my agency could do more than just collect an inventory report or document a bombing scene. The Colombian counterparts also had their reservations about ATF’s worth in the struggle. Unlike the DEA, State Department, FBI, and the Military (among others, who would rather do their good work in anonymity), my agency had no funds to offer them. I showed up alone with nothing more to offer but my agency’s vast investigative and technological expertise and a bold plan to identify gun sources and traffickers we could interdict together from both ends of the supply lines.
No model existed for doing what I went to Colombia to do. Neither did a check list for opening a foreign office. It fell to me to work the problem. My marching orders were astoundingly simple: get down there and see what we can do about it. That’s all. In hind sight, my marching orders more than anything else contributed to my success.
The DEA Attaché and assistant attaché took me in and provided me with all the support I needed, including putting their pilots at my disposal. They also provided me with administrative support without whose help, I would have surely foundered. They assigned an agent as my back up, who played an essential role in my getting started. Later, a DEA analyst took it upon herself to help me by funneling seizure incidents to me. Their selfless support ensured the eventual success of my mission.
I took on an ambitious plan to train as many frontline policemen and soldiers in firearms identification and prepared a simplified tracing form in Spanish for them to use. I put together an identification manual with my contact numbers, stressing the fax number where they could send me trace requests. I also trained intelligence units for the Colombian National Police (CNP), the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), the Army’s 20th Brigade (Intelligence) and the Naval Infantry Intelligence Service. Over my time in Colombia, I had literally trained thousands of Colombian policemen, DAS agents, and military officers that worked the four corners of Colombia. This provided the basis for the intelligence network I established that I will discuss in a later post.
I gained access to the various armories around Bogotá, Villavicencio in the Eastern llanos, Barranquilla and Cartagena on the North Coast, and San Andres Island, among others. I had little trouble identifying the firearms I encountered. Those that confounded me were easily handled with a call to our Firearms Technology Branch. As I gathered my data, I could see a pattern forming. The FARC, ELN, and EPL guerrillas had tapped into the surplus military firearms left over from the then just concluded Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran civil wars. The trace returns of these firearms amazed me.
The countless AK47 and AKM rifles were manufactured in Russia, China, North Korea, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany. The guerrillas also had M16 rifles, some that traced back to the governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua as expected. Some traced back to the Vietnam War era, reported lost ‘over there.’ By a fortuitous coincidence, I had just read ‘Our Man in Panama’ which details then recently deposed Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega’s gun running activities to the anti-government rebels in the Americas. It seems that Manny had fancied himself as a modern-day Simon Bolívar wanting to shake off Yanqui imperialism like the great liberator shook off the Spanish imperialists.
I was also allowed to examine a caché of rifles turned in by the M-19, an urban guerrilla group that had recently agreed to a cease fire in exchange for being allowed to join the legitimate political process. I found a smattering of Central American civil war surplus weapons as I expected. They also surrendered an impressive number of old FN-FAL rifles that bore Venezuelan military inventory stamps. I learned from my counterparts that the Venezuelan military surreptitiously supported the guerrillas in Colombia. The border between Colombia and Venezuela has been in dispute since the countries divided after separating from Spain. I also saw some FN-FAL rifles that had the stamp over the magazine well drilled out. A colleague explained that the guns were likely Cuban, who drilled out the stamp to hide their involvement.
I also found U.S.-sourced firearms other than the World War Two-surplus M-1 carbines provided to the Colombian army in a military aid package or legally imported Smith & Wesson revolvers that had fallen into the hands of the cartel gunmen. I found that the Medellin cartel had evidently secured a supply of U.S. imported Steyr Aug rifles, Israeli Uzi carbines, Beretta, and Glock pistols. They had also established a supply line for Ruger Mini-14 riles and Colt SP-1 rifles; and, Beretta USA, Smith & Wesson, and Colt pistols. I contacted the ATF agents investigating the guns recovered from the Medellin cartel I traced and collaborated with their investigations. Often, the agents had already identified the straw purchasing rings responsible and had lists of guns they suspected they had bought. I asked them for those lists so that I could watch for them among the guns the Colombian police and military seized. I dubbed these lists ‘watch lists’ and used them to conduct instant traces. (At the time, it took two weeks for ATF’s small cadre of tracing analysts to conduct a routine trace).
I passed the details of the seizure incident involving the guns on their watch lists to the domestic ATF investigating the trafficking rings. In turn, the agents provided me with details of how the guns were being taken out of the United States including the techniques they used, the shipping companies they exploited, and when possible, the Colombians linked to the shipment. I passed that information to my Colombian counterparts.
As I reported my findings to headquarters, the project officer assigned to the newly-established international desk questioned whether we should be spending so much of our limited resources on ‘other than U.S.-sourced firearms’. I argued that it would be unwise to withhold our services, limiting it to U.S.-sourced guns. The Colombians had entered the relationship without any reservation. How could we do anything less? They needed our expertise. So I gave it to them.
All things considered, I was off to a good start – until I was asked to assess a cache of grenades. I was absolutely stumped by what I saw. I will relate that experience in the next posting.
